Counterintelligence

... at home and abroad: - My last report on  NK Pro about the efforts of the Kim Clan to make profit - anyhow. I try to show that the DPRK's inner circle relies on hard currency from abroad - and operates much like an organized crime cartel. In my opinion the nice  graph from an informative Wikipedia article about the North Korean economy should definitely be supplemented somehow by an entity named "Criminal activities".

...in den deutschen Medien wollte ich eigentlich ignorieren, aber ich sehe mich nun mal wieder genötigt, auf die allgemeine Verflachung hinzuweisen, die sich ausbreitet. Liest man das ratlose und schlecht recherchierte Gestottere im Blätterwald zu den "rätselhaften Clowns", die derzeit in Deutschland ihr Unwesen treiben, dann fragt man sich: Haben diese Freelancer unter den "Journalisten" denn nicht wenigstens in den bisher drei absolvierten Semestern Politikwissenschaft aufgepasst oder sich auch in dieser Zeit eher mit Handyspielchen und dem von Mutti gesponserten MacBook beschäftigt? Jede anständige Recherche hätte auf eine bestimmte und seit Jahren bekannte Subkultur in den USA hingewiesen und auch die (pseudo)kulturellen Hintergründe verständlich gemacht, die nun von einigen Dummköpfen hierzulande kopiert werden - wie überhaupt die ganze, sinnentleerte "Gangsta"-"Kultur" diverser Kleinkrimineller ohne Schulabschluss. Man werfe einen Blick

... Tracking the DPRK’s intelligence operations - is the title of my new text, published on NK Pro.     This is the first part of a series explaining why North Korea is a top priority target for Western and Asian intelligence agencies.    Anyone who might be interested in my older piece about North Korean intelligence agencies, their structure and operations, should go to " North Korean Intelligence Structures", printed 2009 in the well known North Korean Review . In the next weeks I will publish four more papers about North Korean intelligence, power structure, the existence of organised crime etc. - all to find on NK Pro.

...gone? In the last weeks a few media reports describe the disappearance of Office 39 and 38. The name of the office would be State Affairs Commission (SAC) . It is the old game with North Korea: What is real and what are rumours? One of my favourite intelligence disciplines is RUMINT. In his book  Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence  Robert W. Pringle wrote: Also important was RUMINT (rumor intelligence or gossip) about the leadership of the Soviet Union and East Germany gathered from the talk of Soviet general officers in Berlin with their colleagues and families in Moscow. Many of the books and papers about North Korea are dealing with RUMINT and even my article in  Janes Intelligence Review from 2014 might have been RUMINT, when I mentioned there the rumours that Office 39 and 38 were merged into one new office named Moranbong Bureau.

The current news coverage about Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co., Ltd shows remarkable details about the discreet operations of North Korean agencies. Beside the role of Hong Kong one must come to the conclusion to look deeper into the business networks in Dandong in China, near to the North Korean border. This is definitely one of the places where North Korean procurement agents and traders are active. Dandong is not only a place where Muslims, living in North Korea, can buy halal  meat – as a Twitter user explains, showing this picture: Obviously the business of Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Co., Ltd was more focused on the non-muslim parts of the North Korean society, especially the Kim clan and his network of loyal agencies. Comparing two adresses in Dandong it seems that both participants of this special business didn't have a long distance to walk when it comes to chatting about money and deals. The following shows the

...is the title of a new paper I just published at the King's College London at Project Alpha. A series of allegations made in June 2016 has re-awakened the issue of Pakistani nuclear cooperation with North Korea. These allegations, published by an Indian news agency, state that Pakistani authorities have continued to supply nuclear-related material to North Korea, in violation of sanctions. Project Alpha sought to substantiate or otherwise the allegations utilising open source information. The purpose of this case study is to set out what steps were taken and what information was validated such that follow-on study might be undertaken, should further information become available that could allow a conclusion to be drawn about the validity of the allegations. This paper wouldn't be possible without the great ressources and the kind atmosphere at  Project Alpha! 

Regarding the  Panama Papers the next weeks seems to become interesting. But one can say that some of the until now mentioned entities are not so unknown or even shrouded in absolut secrecy: Take the company which is seen now as pure evil and responsible for the activities of the bad guys around the world: Mossack Fonseca . Nearly all newspaper talk about an "unknown", "secret", "hidden" company, somewhere located in the more shady corners of the world. But is this true? As far I can trust my own database I already found entries and documents e.g. from 2000, when Mossack Fonseca was enlisted in a directory of "Banking, Trust & Financial Services": In the face of successfull business no wonder that in 2003 a worker of the company came to this statement: There are a lot of more entries to find and I only came to those I find in my own database. Some of them were already leaked or hacked years ago and also the name the companies and