Counterintelligence

I read in Israeli media that another high-ranking member of the Iran’s Quds Force is said to have died: AsgharPashapour, a senior member of the Revolutionary Guards’extraterritorial force, was killed Sunday in battle with Syrianopposition forces in Aleppo, the reports said. Somehow this name reminded me of North Korea - but why? Then I remembered: APA, the Asian Parliamentary Assembly! The APA Tenth Plenary Session took place in Istanbul from November 20 to 25, 2017. Numerous interesting Iranians were present, including Pashapour. Due to its members , APA is an extremely important institution anyway, as shown by the list of participating countries in 2017: And as for North Korea: They were there with some of their people: In my opinion, it is these meetings and gatherings that are important for the exchange of information and agreements between the countries that the Western Alliance is watching for good reasons. The problem is tha

... benötigt offenbar für ein Artikelchen über die Liquidierung von Qasem Soleimani die Denkleistung von sage und schreibe 15 Autoren! Soviele werden zumindest auf S. 23 der Printausgabe Nr. 3/11.1.2020 aufgeführt. Dieses gewaltige Opus, das mit schönen, grossen und seitenfüllenden Grafiken geschmückt ist, endet mit der gewichtigen Erkenntnis: "Irgendwann könnte der Schattenkrieg dann zum offenen Krieg werden." Ach ja... "Schattenkrieg", ein spannender, Erwartung weckender Begriff... leider aber wird dazu in dem Artikel, der den Titel "Die Schattenkrieger" trägt, fast nichts geschrieben. Übrigens hatte der Spiegel bereits 2010 unter dem gleichen Titel einen Artikel zum Iran verfasst - allerdings nur von zwei Autoren. Die Arbeit der iranischen Geheimdienste - die sicherlich als Schattenkrieg bezeichnet werden kann - findet im aktuellen Artikel leider keine weitere Beachtung. Dabei ist doch gerade die geheimdienstliche Komponente, die dem Agieren Soleimani

The graphic below shows an overview of the allies of the North Korean regime abroad. This includes naive parliamentarians and members of NGOs who - consciously or unconsciously - can be exploited by North Korea. Communication channels are important, but not at all costs. This topic is part of a chapter on North Korean intelligence that I wrote for the volume " Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference ", which will be published shortly and is edited by Bob de Graaff .

A few days ago, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) complained that it had been hacked, presumably by the evil North Koreans. Other institutions in India also complained about similar attacks. It is possible that North Korea has been trying to gather some information on Indian nuclear technology in order to deal with its own energy problems. That's a strange thing with India and North Korea ... It's not fair that ISRO should be targeted by Pyongyang! After all, both states cultivate the very best of cooperation - even in the field of space research! For example, there is - and the following is absolutely nothing new, but maybe one should be reminded on that - the CENTER FOR SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (CSSTEAP), which advertises: "Affiliated to the United Nations". Therefore the CSSTEAP homepage shows - next to the flag of the United Nations - also the flag of the workers' paradise: For example, for the Academ

Interesting stories to read and watch about  Wang “William” Liqiang or Nick Zhao . But this seems to be a funny coincidence: After all, it is in Australia - obviously a paradise for the Chinese intelligence agencies.

The UN Panel of Experts on North Korea (Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)) writes in his report (S /2019/691): A Mercedes-Maybach S-class limousine was observed first in Pyongyang and then  in  Hanoi  during  the  United  States-Democratic  People’s  Republic  of  Korea summit in February 2019 (p. 22) During my extensive research on this case - which I conducted together with a good friend - I remembered an analysis on North Korean networks in Germany, which I didn't write for the public already in 2014. Beside other details I took a screenshot from a North Korean propaganda video, which showed the following: I'm not an expert on cars, but even the experts who are familiar with it are not completely sure, if one can see one or two Maybachs in the background. On the left side it might be an older Mercedes S-class. I am pretty sure that sanctions doesn't work - and the more people will pay for luxury goods the more they will find shady traders who are willin

... and a lot of other countries in this great anthology, coming very soon: Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference About the content and the authors: Intelligence Communities in Asia— B. de Graaff. Afghanistan— D. Patang . Bangladesh— A.S.M. Ali Ashraf . China— X. Guo . India— P. Mahadevan . Iran— C.A. Wege . Iraq— I. al-Marashi . Israel— E. Kahana . Japan— Y. Kobayashi. Jordan— H. Al Jbour Kazakhstan— F. Kovacevic . Myanmar— A. Selth . North Korea— S. Blancke . Pakistan— K. Mukherjee . Palestine— A. Tartir . Russia— A. Kozovoï . Saudi Arabia— C.M. Davidson . South Korea— D.-A. Neuhaus . Sri Lanka— V.K. Shashikumar . Syria— F. Peil . Taiwan— J. Rosenke . Tajikistan— A. Matveeva . Turkey— I. Yilmaz . Yemen— A. Chimente . Elements of an Asian Intelligence Culture— B. de Graaff .