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Morgado didn't make it - China in Brussels

Why is there such a fuss about the leaking of the planned meeting between José Casimiro Morgado - director of the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN) - and colleagues from the Taiwanese intelligence service? One can only smile at the hectic chatter about this. On the one hand, it is once again frightening how little expertise there is in the media on Taiwanese intelligence architecture and how this ignorance is concealed with painfully clueless presentations. On the subject of Taiwan intelligence I can recommend the excellent chapter by my friend and colleague Jens Rosenke, which he published in the anthology Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference . But besides the ignorance about the Taiwanese security bureaucracy, this naivety about China's insights is also astonishing: How did Beijing find out about this "Top Secret" affair? What happened there? What did evil Beijing do to get this information? Source: ht

How EU and Germany abet Iranian military research

US President Biden's visit to the Middle East has brought to mind an issue that has receded somewhat into the background since the war in Ukraine: the looming threat of a highly armed Iran - along with the option that the regime in Tehran has deployable nuclear weapons. Equally worrying are reports that Russia is being supplied with Iranian military technology, including drones , large numbers of which could be deployed by Russia in Ukraine. Other states are also showing interest in Iranian drones. I take this reporting as an opportunity to draw attention to a report that is aimed in particular at German industry as well as institutions involved in proliferation investigations: In this account, the recent death of an Iranian scientist - presumed to have been the victim of an attack - leads to a network of scientists and experts who conduct their research at an academic institution within the EU. The results of their work also benefit the Iranian military and Iran's nuclear pro

Wie EU und Deutschland die iranische Militärforschung begünstigen

Der Besuch des US-Präsidenten Biden im Nahen Osten hat ein Thema in Erinnerung gerufen, welches seit dem Krieg in der Ukraine etwas in den Hintergrund gerückt ist: Die drohende Gefahr eines militärisch hochgerüsteten Irans – samt der Option, dass das Regime in Teheran über einsatzfähige Nuklearwaffen verfügt. Ebenso besorgniserregend sind Berichte, nach denen Russland mit iranischer Militärtechnologie beliefert wird, darunter Drohnen , welche in grosser Stückzahl von Russland in der Ukraine einsetzen werden könnte. Auch andere Staaten zeigen Interesse an iranischen Drohnen. Diese Berichterstattung nehme ich zum Anlass, um auf eine politikwissen-schaftliche Risikoanalyse hinzuweisen, die sich insbesondere an die deutsche Industrie sowie die mit Proliferationsermittlungen befassten Institutionen richtet: Der kürzliche Tod eines iranischen Wissenschaftlers – mutmaßlich ist er einem Anschlag zum Opfer gefallen – führt in dieser Darstellung zu einem Netzwerk von Wissenschaftlern und Exper

Stucked in France

A favourable wind had driven me to beautiful Bolougne-sur-mer  at the Channel. By accident there I discovered one of the many offshoots of the Ukraine war: a Russian vessel detained by the French government back in February 2022 .  The MV Baltic Leader is owned by the Russian  TransMorFlot LLC, which manages more than 30 vessels. On approaching there was no activity on board to be seen. Maybe the Russians were working inside, busy with launching a mini sub or small submersible ROV (R emote Operated Vehicles)... A captain I got talking to told me that the Russians were not allowed to disembark - though I wonder if that is actually the case. 

Wind of change?

Founded in 1952 in Hamburg, the Atlantik-Brücke organisation is considered one of the most influential networks in Germany and has had its office in Berlin for many years. Its stated goal is a traditional US-focused policy.  It is a member of the New Traditions Network (NTN). From the NTN's spartan website it can be seen that it has its official headquarter  in the US Embassy in Berlin and is administered from there .  The Atlantik-Brücke can significantly raise now its profile due to the current crisis with Russia: From 1 June 2022, Julia Friedlander will become the new executive director in Berlin. In 2020, she had voiced clear criticism of the Russian government as co-author of the report „ Defending the United States against Russian dark money “. But she had already consistently positioned herself against Russia during her 2015 to 2017 work at the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes and 2017 to 2020 at the White House National Security Council. In 2017, she wa

Options and risks for arms industry in Berlin

Since March 2022, the  Predator drone manufacturer   General Atomics Europe GmbH has a representative office in Berlin. The office manager, Frank Sitta, is to push lobbying work at the German seat of government. His chances should be good, because as a long-standing member of the liberal FDP and its deputy chairman until 2021, he has the best connections in the government. Sitta reports directly to Stefan Klein, Head of strategic business development at the companys headquarter in Dresden.  The reorientation of German security policy since the Russian attack on Ukraine opens up new options, especially for the defence companies represented in Berlin. Well-known companies include Ariane Group , General Dynamics European Land Systems , German Naval Yards Kiel GmbH , the Swiss RUAG , Saab and Thales . More unknown but highly specialised are CTC Medical , partner of the US company Tactial Medical Solutions , the IT service provider genua GmbH , which among other things develops secret com

Die Russen in der Ukraine

Es mag eventuell zweitrangig sein, aber dennoch ist ein Blick auf jene Liste interessant, die angeblich die 120.000 russischen Soldaten beinhaltet, welche teilweise in die Ukraine einmarschiert sind. Vorausgesetzt, diese Liste entspricht der Wahrheit, erkennt man zum einen die Verteilung der Frauen und Männer, deren Knotenpunkte jeweils rechts und links in der Darstellung zu finden sind. Auch interessant ist, dass es - soweit ich diese Liste, die durchaus in Teilen chaotisch gestaltet ist,  halbwegs bereinigen konnte - Soldaten gibt, die nicht mit dem Dienstrang, sondern einer Nummer aufgeführt werden. Dafür gibt es vermutlich eine einfache Erklärung. Und schliesslich ist es auch bemerkenswert, dass die drei Ältesten unter den Zigtausenden Jahrgang 1954 sind. Alle drei Personen bekleiden offenbar aber nur einen niedrigen Dienstgrad, so wie dieser hier: Man kann hoffen, dass es weitere interessante Daten geben wird, die bessere Rückschlüsse auf das russische Militär zulassen!