Donnerstag, 31. Januar 2019

Bioweapons in the wrong hands


For decades, bioweapons have been an integral part of nation states' arsenals. Their efficiency for military purposes has often been disputed, as they are not only too slow from a tactical point of view but also complicated to use. Consequently, very few states have actually employed bioweapons in the past. During the Second World War, the Japanese military used various pathogenic agents, such as for cholera or the plague, to harm the Chinese population. The Cold War saw a number of accidents in laboratories and on testing grounds in the Eastern Bloc, during which anthrax and smallpox were released, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries. Nowadays, various states have opaque or secret programmes for developing bioweapons, the trade of which increases the risk of proliferation.

So far, there have merely been rumours about the misuse of genetic research in the military realm and for operations contrary to international law. Apparently, the North Korean biologist Ri Chae Woo worked on a bioweapon designed to recognise and kill individuals based on their genetic characteristics. Ri was reported to have tried fleeing to the Australian consulate in the Chinese city of Guangzhou on September 5, 2003, but has been missing since. The Australian House of Representatives discussed this largely unknown incident (Questions On Notice, Foreign Affairs: North Korea, Question 2385, Monday, October 13, 2003). Nevertheless, reports on North Korean defectors who claim to have witnessed such experiments on humans have yet to be verified.



Intelligence operations such as the assassination of the North Korean dictator's brother Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia in 2017 or of the former GRU employee Skripal in the UK in 2018 show that chemical weapons are a common choice when political opponents or alleged traitors are to be liquidated. In practice, bioweapons are not only unpredictable and put the attacker at risk of contagion but the sensitive pathogens must also be kept alive throughout the process.

Non-state actors generally pose a far greater threat - as far as I compiled corresponding incidents here:

Year
Actor
Country
Weapon
Produced
Stored
Employed
1972
Right-wing
USA
Typhus
Unknown
Yes
No
1981
Environmental extremists
UK
Anthrax
Unknown
Yes
Yes
1984
Religious cult
USA
Salmonella
Unknown
Yes
Yes
1992
Right-wing
USA
Ricin
Yes
Yes
No
1993
Right-wing
USA
Ricin
Yes
Yes
No
1990s
Religious cult
Japan
Anthrax, Botulinum, Q Fever (+ Sarin)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2001
Unclear
USA
Anthrax
Unknwon
Unknown
Yes
2003
Islamists
UK
Ricin
Unclear
Unclear
No
2004
Islamists
France
Botulinum, Ricin
Unclear
Unclear
No
2018
Islamists
Germany
Ricin
Yes
Yes
No
 
Aside from specific incidents, one can find in the Dark Web numerous hints, documents and statements about the production and deployment of bioweapons from various sides of the terrorist, extremist and religious spectrum.

Since this topic is not only thrilling, but also important, I just published a new paper with Janes Intelligence Review, titled "Dark web users show interest in ricin". This and other texts can be found here.