Bioweapons in the wrong hands

For decades, bioweapons have been an integral part of nation states' arsenals. Their efficiency for military purposes has often been disputed, as they are not only too slow from a tactical point of view but also complicated to use. Consequently, very few states have actually employed bioweapons in the past. During the Second World War, the Japanese military used various pathogenic agents, such as for cholera or the plague, to harm the Chinese population. The Cold War saw a number of accidents in laboratories and on testing grounds in the Eastern Bloc, during which anthrax and smallpox were released, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries. Nowadays, various states have opaque or secret programmes for developing bioweapons, the trade of which increases the risk of proliferation.

So far, there have merely been rumours about the misuse of genetic research in the military realm and for operations contrary to international law. Apparently, the North Korean biologist Ri Chae Woo worked on a bioweapon designed to recognise and kill individuals based on their genetic characteristics. Ri was reported to have tried fleeing to the Australian consulate in the Chinese city of Guangzhou on September 5, 2003, but has been missing since. The Australian House of Representatives discussed this largely unknown incident (Questions On Notice, Foreign Affairs: North Korea, Question 2385, Monday, October 13, 2003). Nevertheless, reports on North Korean defectors who claim to have witnessed such experiments on humans have yet to be verified.

Intelligence operations such as the assassination of the North Korean dictator's brother Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia in 2017 or of the former GRU employee Skripal in the UK in 2018 show that chemical weapons are a common choice when political opponents or alleged traitors are to be liquidated. In practice, bioweapons are not only unpredictable and put the attacker at risk of contagion but the sensitive pathogens must also be kept alive throughout the process.

Non-state actors generally pose a far greater threat - as far as I compiled corresponding incidents here:

Year	Actor	Country	Weapon	Produced	Stored	Employed
1972	Right-wing	USA	Typhus	Unknown	Yes	No
1981	Environmental extremists	UK	Anthrax	Unknown	Yes	Yes
1984	Religious cult	USA	Salmonella	Unknown	Yes	Yes
1992	Right-wing	USA	Ricin	Yes	Yes	No
1993	Right-wing	USA	Ricin	Yes	Yes	No
1990s	Religious cult	Japan	Anthrax, Botulinum, Q Fever (+ Sarin)	Yes	Yes	Yes
2001	Unclear	USA	Anthrax	Unknwon	Unknown	Yes
2003	Islamists	UK	Ricin	Unclear	Unclear	No
2004	Islamists	France	Botulinum, Ricin	Unclear	Unclear	No
2018	Islamists	Germany	Ricin	Yes	Yes	No

 

Aside from specific incidents, one can find in the Dark Web numerous hints, documents and statements about the production and deployment of bioweapons from various sides of the terrorist, extremist and religious spectrum.

Since this topic is not only thrilling, but also important, I just published a new paper with Janes Intelligence Review, titled "Dark web users show interest in ricin". This and other texts can be found here.