The Turkish intelligence agencies have various interesting cover organisations and offices in Europe from which they operate. Sometimes these are lobby firms, cultural and language associations, but also think tanks and supposed research institutions. Sometimes they can simply be commercial companies that serve as a cover. In addition, there is a large reservoir of reliable contacts in the diaspora that are always available.
In doing so, the Turkish government is following a successful tactic that has been observed for some time in other states - both enemy and friendly: The structural and geographical outsourcing of intelligence resources and capacities in order to operate effectively from there, i.e. another location. This not only involves outsourcing to non-state actors, but also the relocation of employees of a state intelligence service. This takes them out of the public or media spotlight. In addition - and this applies to Turkey in particular - individual representatives of these often nepotistic structures create their own small intelligence cells that are not accountable to anyone and are sometimes located in completely different areas of the bureaucracy.
In democratic systems, this can be integrated into a legal framework and also controlled. However, this requires political will, a certain willingness to take risks and also money. And before anyone wonders: Of course, there is no such thing with German intelligence agencies, as this would first require decades of parliamentary debate, human rights and data protection officers to be heard and funding to be authorised. In short: No, Germany plays no role in this area either and instead has to hope that its dear friends will sporadically hand over a few intelligence crumbs.
To come back to Turkey. Things haven't always gone as well as they would have liked recently. That's probably why they thought: we need a bit of variety, a bit more momentum and perhaps a few new branches here and there…
The Turkish security authorities continue to operate in a difficult domestic and foreign policy environment. Since Erdogan's former security adviser Ibrahim Kalin took over as head of the MIT in June 2023, this trend has tended to intensify. MIT and the Turkish National Police's Intelligence Unit (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü İstihbarat Başkanlığı) have been repeatedly criticised internationally. In July 2024, they were accused of monitoring US and British citizens travelling to Turkey in order to prevent them from carrying out 'hostile' actions: This refers to contacts with Kurdish organisations or Gülen activists.
The authorities were also unable to prevent an embarrassing incident on 2 September 2024: Members of the USS Wasp, which was anchored in Izmir, were insulted and attacked on the street by the radical left-wing, nationalist organisation Turkey Youth Union (Türkiye Gençlik Birliği - TGB). Videos of this are circulating on social media. The TGB also appears time and again in Europe at demonstrations by liberal Turks who are criticised for being too Western. The organisation is often perceived as an extension of Turkish nationalist interests abroad. The TGB attack on the US soldiers in Izmir is highly embarrassing for NATO member Turkey and could not be prevented by the Turkish security authorities.
MIT was last humiliated on 21 July 2024: Turkish journalist Cevheri Güven, who lives in exile in Germany, reported on a data leak on his YouTube channel: a hacker had stolen the identity of 850 MIT employees. Intelligence Online reported on 16 September 2024, that the hacker had used the pseudonym Hackerdede1 and operated a Telegram channel, which has since been closed. Somebody told me that the hacker had uploaded the dataset to his server and planned to sell data queries for a fee. This data has since been deleted and the hacker has been arrested by Turkish authorities. For MIT, it is currently completely unclear whether this data leak jeopardises its operations abroad.
The closure of SETA's German-language website may also be due to the hack: The Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Arastirmalari Vakfi - SETA) describes itself as a scientific think tank. It is considered as an instrument of Turkish interests and seems to be controlled by MIT. Ibrahim Kalin was its director from 2005 to 2009. SETA was already part of parliamentary debates in Germany and is criticised for numerous publications: In these, profiles of critical journalists, dissidents and politicians are often distributed and Western governments are vilified. The website of the Berlin office is currently closed. The SETA sign has also disappeared. There is still a reference to the Yunus Emre Institute, which is subordinate to the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı - YTB). YTB coordinates the influence operations on the Turkish and Muslim diaspora in Germany and other countries. The coordinator of the Berlin office, Zafer Meşe, is known as an admirer of Erdogan and supporter of his party, the AKP. In Brussels, the 'independent think tank' SETA has its office a few meters beside the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the European Union.
Another embarrassment for MIT resulted from the reporting of an appearance by Erdogan in January 2024: Photos taken from the hall during the speech of Erdogan, who attended the 97th anniversary of the establishment of the MIT, were shared on social media. In the photos, the faces of the participants, presumably including high-ranking members of the MIT, were seen. However, the post was later edited and the photos were removed. The Ministry of Justice also first shared the photos in question and then removed them.
Kommentare
Kommentar veröffentlichen