"We didn't know anything about it" - China's espionage in Europe

I read in Intelligence Online that France has apparently now definitely refused a visa to a Chinese researcher. He wanted to take part in a seminar on Tibet that was being held in Paris. Reason: This researcher works at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). Intelligence Online summarises the reasons for this very comprehensibly: „The CICIR is one of Beijing's oldest and most influential institutes for international research studies, which reports directly to the Ministry of State Security (MSS or Guoanbu)and is supervised by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).“

In a Wikipedia entry it is formulated even more viciously and clearly: 
"The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations […] is the cover identity of the 11th Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS). It is a set of research institutes used as a front to influence foreign diplomats and academics and collect intelligence. Located in Beijing, CICIR is operated by senior MSS officers. A 2009 report from the CIA´s Open Source Centerconcluded that CICIR resembles a "Soviet-style intelligence organ" whose principle intelligence customer is the Foreign Affairs Leading Group. CICIR is overseen by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party." 

The fact that the CICIR has been known for many years for its ‘closeness’ to the Chinese intelligence agencies and the Chinese Communist Party should be nothing new. But it still comes as a surprise - or does it? - the extent to which German institutes and organisations of all kinds are quite unconcernedly seeking proximity to the CICIR. It reminds me a little of the naivety with which certain politicians, business leaders and interest groups cosied up to Putin for years. Today, most of them no longer want to know about it or regret it. Obviously, it will take a few more years before they realise how naively and blindly they have thrown themselves into China's arms. For the Chinese intelligence agencies, it is of course a nice thing if they can - together with the institute of a private Berlin university - organise a  multi-day event in Warsaw at the end of 2023, for example. What did the participants talk about there? Cybersecurity and the EU's future approach in this sensitive area. This is of course a very interesting topic for the eavesdroppers from Beijing. How I would have loved to have been there to observe the exchange of business cards and other niceties. 

The CICIR is so intensively involved with German interests that it should actually establish a German-language section on its website. Just a few weeks ago the CICIR was once again focussing on the German National Security Strategy. And if I take a look at the older documents, which - due to "certain reasons" - the CICIR server no longer provides today, then I start to wonder a little about these personal and institutional "encounters" between this traditional representative of Chinese espionage and some German entities.

China and its CICIR, which - as far as I can see - does not appear in any single public report by the German intelligence agencies, is part of an increasingly strong network of states that cooperate in intelligence and that reject the West and its values. I wrote a brief article about this for the October issue of the Europäische Sicherheit und Technik. In the paper, I divide this network into three groups of actors, each of which has to fulfill a specific function.