When Iranian engineer Ayoob Entezari died under unexplained circumstances in Iran in May 2022, Israeli media reported that he had been involved in the development of drones and missiles at the Iranian company Ghadir Industrial Turbines Company (GITCO). Photos and vidoes show Entezari giving then-ruler Hassan Rouhani a tour through the factory in 2019. Not least the contradictory reaction of the Iranian authorities had reinforced the suspicion that Entezari, like other Iranian scientists, had been deliberately liquidated - with reference being made to Israeli intelligence.
Iranian drones are now an export hit and play a major role in the war against Ukraine. One aspect is therefore of key importance: how do Iran and other states manage to expand their know-how and improve their specific expertise? Despite existing sanctions, there are obviously research institutions in the EU that employ doctoral students and scientists from institutions that have been subject to strict sanctions for years in some cases. Entezari was able to gain further qualifications at the renowned Italian Politecnico di Torino. He is still listed on the website of the University of Turin as a former employee with his project, and his doctoral thesis is available for download. This mentions Sharif University of Technology (SUT) as a cooperation partner, where Entezari had already obtained his Master's degree in 2009. He earned his bachelor's degree at the Shahid Sattari University of Aeronautical Engineering of the Iranian Air Force in 2007, an exclusively military facility. The SUT is named in numerous sanctions lists. It is known to have been conducting research for the Iranian nuclear programme and other military projects for years. Its co-operation partners are also frequently German institutions.
Entezari worked in Turin in the MUL2 research group, which deals with the „structural analysis and design of aerospace and mechanical structures“ and the „modelling of multi-component structures, e.g. aircraft wings and fuselage, launch vehicles“ etc. Among other things, MUL2 conducts research into „various applications, including Aeroelasticity, Aircraft and Spacecraft Design .... rotor dynamics.“ In short, this is the kind of technology that is of great importance to high-risk states such as Iran, China and North Korea. These and other countries have been trying to catch up in this sensitive area for years and therefore have to circumvent the existing sanctions.
After the Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported on Entezari's activities at the Italian institute in January 2023, one would have thought that this careless practice would have been reconsidered. Shortly afterwards, the renowned Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich - ETHZ) made the headlines for massively intensifying the vetting process of students and scientists from specific countries - including Iran - following various incidents of espionage. None of this has prevented the University of Turin, which is a member of the European University Alliance, from continuing its co-operation with controversial or sanctioned institutions.
The research group's original website was deleted some time ago, restructured and integrated into the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering (DIMEAS).
DIMEAS alone continues to employ certain people, some of whom come from institutions that have been under strict sanctions for years or continue to be supervised by them. These include, for example, the Iranian Amir Kabir University of Technology, about which the website Iran Watch states, among other things: „(It) has conducted research relevant to uranium enrichment, the development of a nuclear implosion device, and missile guidance.“ These also include the Beijing University of Technology or the Chinese Southeast University (SEU), which is classified by the Australian University Tracker as „a leading Chinese university that engages in high levels of defence research, linked to cyberespionage.“ Another typical example is a certain Chinese doctoral student who studied at Nanchang Hangkong University from 2017 to 2021. According to University Tracker, this is „designated high risk for its close relationship to the defence industry and high level of defence research, Security Credentials: secret.“ From 2019 to 2021, he studied in Ukraine in order to conduct research at the Moscow Aviation Institute from 2021 to 2023. This institute is sanctioned by US OFAC as well as Switzerland and Japan. The sanctions lists of these three states are considered authoritative and particularly detailed. Other countries and institutions are represented at DIMEAS, some of which are considered dubious or play a role in sanctions violations. These include, for example, individual Pakistani research institutions.
MUL2, which exists as a research group within DIMEAS, is a partner of the PoliTo Rocket Team, consisting of researchers „entirely dedicated to the research, design, and construction of rocket engines.“
It is obvious that this area of research is of great interest to the countries mentioned.
International scientific exchange is important and not all scientists conduct research on behalf of a rough state. However, sensitive knowledge from these areas often flows back to those states that are expanding their military and nuclear potential. There is a network of scientists and institutions that co-operates with e.g. the Chinese military or the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division (SPD), for example. Various members of this network conduct their research throughout Germany and other EU member states. It would go beyond the scope of this short article to describe the network in Germany alone. However, other EU countries are also actively involved in awarding qualifications to scientists from highly questionable institutes - which I describe in a comprehensive private report.
The GITCO website, where Entezari worked until his death, was operated by a German provider until 2022. GITCO itself still sells Siemens turbines and - due to its website - „control cubicles based on SIEMENS S7 PLC technology.“ This technology, which is used in uranium enrichment, among other things, was the target of the Stuxnet attack, which was used around 2010 by Western intelligence agencies to sabotage Iran's nuclear programme. Siemens also appears as a partner of the PoliTo Rocket Team.
In August 2022 Siemens explained, "that the manufacturing expertise for the aforementioned turbine types and components was transferred several years ago to a former cooperation partner in Iran in compliance with export control regulations. The relevant contracts have since been terminated. We do not know whether this partner in turn qualified GITCO as a supplier or whether GITCO, as its website suggests, may be using reverse engineering to manufacture the technologically relatively simple blades."
In my experience, this cannot be ruled out and seems to be plausible. However, this does not change the actual problem, which is that research institutions ultimately do not make much effort to take a closer look at the origins of their visiting scientists. In addition to a lack of interest, this may also be due to a lack of resources. Countries such as Iran, China, North Korea and a host of dubious shell companies where these scientists can work are delighted about this.
In my experience, this cannot be ruled out and seems to be plausible. However, this does not change the actual problem, which is that research institutions ultimately do not make much effort to take a closer look at the origins of their visiting scientists. In addition to a lack of interest, this may also be due to a lack of resources. Countries such as Iran, China, North Korea and a host of dubious shell companies where these scientists can work are delighted about this.
