Mittwoch, 21. Februar 2018

Shady business behind CPEC

The last months a lot of paper about the CPEC were produced - regarding the Chinese political-economic agenda in South East Asia. Beside the official and more or less transparent economic relations between both countries Jens Rosenke and me are, as always, more interested in the shady corners of economic projects, especially when it comes to sanctioned or in general security related technology.

Therefore we worked a while on a paper, which is mainly about the research in proliferation and illegal procurement issues.

But of course we also found a lot of smaller and bigger entities somehow connected in interesting ways and sometimes busy in disguising their intentions.

The good thing is: "Investigating proliferation activities between China and Pakistan" is free for download!

Recently, I had put a part of my archive online as a searchable version, where one can find also various entries on proliferation, China or Pakistan. The paper, which is now available for download on my website, could only be produced due to Jens Rosenke's knowledge of military details and his ability to find and read hidden original Chinese documents.

Sonntag, 18. Februar 2018

Another boring Reichsbürger...

... can look for a T-Shirt here:

One can also buy it as a "Braunhemd" which means here a brown coloured T-Shirt:

Who is behind Abarcshop?

But this time no Chinese company, but a German contact:


Donnerstag, 25. Januar 2018

Reichsbürger Hoodie

Funny to see: Since months one can read about the so-called Reichsbürger movement, sometimes about really alarming incidents, e.g. German anti-terror police uncover hidden paramilitary training camps for far-right extremists.

But there are always smart people who see the opportunity:

I found this on 25th January 2018 and it doesn't look like fake:

Everything is possible and I remember the Hitler-cups sold in Germany by the Chinese in 2014. So I took a brief look into this company. The section "Über uns" ( "About us") is in pretty horrible German, looks like a foreign background. There we go:

It's so obvious: China doesn't like political uproar in it's own country, but it doesn't care for others: The registrar is which is a Chinese company, you can call them and complain about double standards:

Freitag, 19. Januar 2018

The name Abbas Kamel...

...reminds me of something... Reading that the Egypt President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi issued a presidential decree on Thursday afternoon appointing his office director General Abbas Kamel as acting director of Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate let me think about the past.

I wonder if the Abbas Kamel mentioned in an unclassified cable about IRAQI MEDIA OUTLETS BASED IN JORDAN: PROFILES is the one who is now the acting director of the Mukhabarat:

In 2015 my old friend Nizar Manek wrote - together with Jeremy Hodge - an excellent paper about Opening the black  box of Egypt's slush funds and there Abbas Kamel appeared again. Nizar wrote:

So Abbas Kamel, who is named by Intelligence Online  the eminence grise of Egyptian President, is somehow famous. It is obvious that a few people getting bad-tempered about this.

Montag, 1. Januar 2018

The North Korean lifeline... also maintained by vessels, but obviously it is not so easy to detect every single entity. Actually it is reported that South Korean authorities have seized a Panama-flagged vessel suspected of transferring oil products to North Korea. The vessel named KOTI is the former SEMUA SEJATI. The IMO number of a vessel remains linked to the hull for its lifetime, regardless of a change in name, flag, or owner. Due to the ongoing reflagging and renaming of vessels one must look for the shipping company, the owner etc. In this case owner and manager of the KOTI resp. the SEMUA SEJATI in former times was SEMUA SHIPPING in Malaysia. This is a company with a rich history of details, documents, addresses etc.

Information: I do not suggest that any of the companies, agencies and persons I mention in this Post are engaged in illicit activity.

SEMUA SHIPPING is a subsidiary of Hoe Leong Corporation Ltd., a company holding stake in various industries and which already gained experience in the difficulties doing business with shipping. The wind for SEMUA SHIPPING sesms not to be friendly in these days. And various industry newsletters and media reports are confusing, because some other entities - subsidiaries and owners - are mentioned and somehow connected. Bloombergs says, that "Semua Shipping Sdn Bhd owns and operates a fleet of oil and chemical tankers, as well as tugs and barges. It serves oil companies. The company was incorporated in 1980 and is based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Semua Shipping Sdn Bhd operates as a subsidiary of Semua International Sdn. Bhd." Bloomberg also says, that "Semua International Sdn. Bhd. is an investment holding company which through its subsidiaries provides oil tanker and transport logistic services. The company is based in Malaysia. Semua International Sdn. Bhd. operates as a subsidiary of Sumatec Resources Berhad." Regarding The Star Online Sumatec is "the company, which manages and oversees the production operations of an oil and gas field in Kazakhstan, told Bursa Malaysia that the order for the winding up of Semado, a subsidiary of shipping firm Semua International Sdn Bhd in which the company has 49% stake, was given on April 13.Sumatec said it did not control the associate company and its subsidiaries. “The winding up order was only found out by the company’s own initiatives on May 15, 2017,” it said."

At the moment it seems that SEMUA SHIPPING owns those vessels:

The last two of them listed above are sailing actually under another name: The former SEMUA SELAMAT sails now under the name ES ASPIRE, currently on the way to Pontianak in Indonesia. The other one - LADY ASTRID - is now LISSE, sailing under the flag of the Marshall Islands.Regarding the last report (Jan 01, 2018 21:35 UTC) the LISSE is anchored in the Russian port of Novorossiyk. Years ago food aid was shipped by the Russia's state-owned United Grain Company via this port to North Korea. Compared to North Korean interests Novorossiyk is an interesting location: 2004 a truck with a 30 kg box of radioactive americium arrived at this port.Various media reports describe the shipment of weapons from Novorossiyk to Tartous, which is Russia's military facility in Syria. One vessel shipped on behalf of Almar Shipping, the company which transported weapons from the Ukraine to South Sudan. And Novorossiyk is also mentioned in a statement from OFAC, which has "designating four companies because they materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,OJSC Sovfracht, which was previously designated under E.O. 13685 for being owned or controlled by an entity operating in Crimea", here the fuel supplier Solid Ltd., located at ul Mira 4,Novorossiysk, Krasnodarskiy kray, 630024, RU.

Also interesting in this story are the Marshall Islands, mentioned by the US State Department as a country/jurisdiction of Primary Concern. Obviously for good reasons: In 2016 NK Pro titled Mongolia enforces latest sanctions on North Korean ships and mentioned the Dawnlight, a ship which is "blacklisted by the UN, the U.S. and was previously owned by a Singaporean company which helped North Korea smuggle weapons. According to the Equasis Maritime Database, it ended up in the hands of Sinotug Shipping, a company in the Marshall Islands with a limited footprint."

The here mentioned events might be totally irrelevant, but it is necessary to go to those shady places where rogue states as North Korea are finding the things they need or they want to sell. Novorossiyk definitely belongs to this category and who knows what kind of cargo will be loaded or exchanged there between the anchored ships.

Montag, 18. Dezember 2017

Why sanctions doesn't work with North Korea...

...or: Chatting with Chinese secretary

I did some research about the North Korean Tanchon Mining Machine Factory, a well known actor in the DPRK, often mentioned in various reports and a factory the North Koreans are proud of.

Looking for this factory I was guided to one company in China, named Xinhai Machine. Why? Because on their website they are aggregating news from their industry.Beside others they offered me an article in an North Korean journal I sometimes read anyway:

Staying a few seconds on their website I received friendly  help:

I didn't want to frustrate my business-minded star and so I started an interesting chat, which offered me some insights into trading with - firstly - totally unaware people:

  Due to the easy atmosphere I decided to be straightforward:

Following the email is easy and I found a few interesting clues, e.g. about their participation in the 12th International Exhibition of Mine, Mining, Construction Machinery and Related Equipment in Iran (2016):
 Unfortunately even the other search results showed nothing unusual, e.g. the one I found in the Cayman Islands Gazette from Monday, 25 September 2017, Issue No. 20/2017, page - which one should examine if this is related to the company I was chatting with:

Etc. etc. etc.

More interesting was looking for all the various email-addresses Xinhai seems to use, beside others this one:, which leads me to  the website The contact details are precise and show that both websites mentioned here are representing the same company. The following grim face is from Mr. Ding Hui:
This is what I meant with DPRK: North Korea. It seems that Xinhai really doesn't sell CNC machines, but any other mining stuff wouldn't be the problem. They are more or less open to any business and promote it frankly:

 Their websites mentions an interesting project which is possibly sanctioned:

Obviously this project is up-to-date:

Due to my tight timetable I didn't dig deeper, but I am  sure behind those friendly faces in Iran, Sudan etc. something is to find:

My chat showed me again how simple it is for the regime in Pyongyang to circumvent sanctions and to gain money. A trader who is asking about the meaning of "DPRK" will not hesitate to deliver any item to PYC.

Samstag, 22. Juli 2017

Tracking illicit trade networks in Asia... something I like to do, because it definitely pays off.

2016 I wrote something about the connection between China, Pakistan and North Korea - which resulted in a lot of harsh reactions from Pakistan.

Well, I am ready to take another slap: My new piece is some kind of continuation - even if North Korea seems not to be so present this time. The key-points in this case are:
  • State-sponsored or state-owned companies that are engaged in illicit proliferation and procurement are likely to use networks of smaller, less prominent companies in their activities.
  • A case study involving the sale of potentially proliferation-relevant products from a Chinese company to a Pakistani company underlines the level of complexity and opacity that is involved in the operations of these networks.
  • Organised crime groups may be able to circumvent sanctions by using small, inconspicuous companies, as well as discreet financial transactions.
The paper is published by Jane's Intelligence Review online and will be out as a printed version soon.