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Reading and thinking...


Obviously there is a lack of serious analysis of the current leaks from Edward Snowden and the so called “scandals” about hacked mobiles from governmental officials as the German chancellor or other more or less important persons around the globe. It is a real problem to let the media – despite their in parts brave role in the NSA-case – or the intelligence agencies themselves explain the How and Why of surveillance and monitoring communication. Terms from the intelligence sector are too often mixed with conspiracy theories. Technical definitions are described as if there would have never been any statement about them before.

E.g. “Spiegel Online” writes that the Merkel mobile would be on the NSA watch list since 2002. The article points to an ominous unit called "Special Collection Service" (SCS), almost as if the world would hear for the first time from SCS. But it was – beside many, many others – “The Spiegel”, who wrote 2001 about the KGB spy Robert Hanssen: “Für die Russen war er eine glänzende Investition, denn vermutlich hat Hanssen sogar die Kronjuwelen der US-Dienste ausgehändigt: Informationen über den "Special Collection Service", der, gesteuert von der CIA und der Abhörbehörde NSA, auf heimischem Boden ausländische Botschaften überwacht und im Ausland mit modernstem Hightech-Lauschgerät die elektronische Kommunikation von Regierungen, Behörden und Militär mitschneidet.“

And there are plenty of other articles to read, official or gray literature and leaked classified documents. For example one of the few very good reference books writes about the Central Security Service (CSS): "... CSS has within it - like a matryoshka nesting Doll - the quiet more elite and clandestine SCS. Primarily Composed of NSA Specialists, SCS operatives typically use diplomatic cover in order to put in place eavesdropping equipment in areas where access to U.S. intelligence by less laborious means would be considerably more difficult " (Lerner / Lerner ( Ed.): Encyclopedia Of Espionage , Intelligence And Security , Volume 3 , Farmington Hills 2004, p 103) .

What about a rereading of the reports of the European Parliament? Already in October 1999 Duncan Campbell has found clear words for the SCS and the technology they used. Yes, it is connected with archival research and has nothing to do with tabloid press nonsense. Go to the library and read PE 168 184 Volume 2/5: Read and think.

There is enough to study before start planning a counterintelligence operation, but it is necessary to look to similar aspects of intelligence covert work. For a current view on the developments of a few intelligence operational standards I recommend Mark Mazzetti and his last book “The Way Of The Knife. The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the End of the Earth”, published 2013 by Penguin Press. There you find many valuable references to present-day intelligence undercover work, outsourcing, assassination, drones etc. And of course one should read the publications of “them” to understand the special current approach. “No Data, No Analysis” was the meaningful title of an essay in “The Intelligencer. Journal Of U.S. Intelligence Studies” from Fall/Winter 2005. And already in 2000 one could read about “Covert Action and Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century” (Chapter 19 in John Jacob Nutter´s book about “The CIA´s Black Ops”). Of course the work from the SCS and other units is highly connected to covert operations.

A few years earlier Charles D. Ameringer wrote his very readable book about “U.S. Foreign Inteligence: The secret Side Of American History” (1990), especially Chapter 18 about “The Clandestine CIA” is still somehow a modern analysis. But it seems that many of those naive politicians, responsible for intelligence work AND the counterintelligence failures, should read some more offensive, but quite good books like “How to Stage a Military Coup” form David Hebditch and Ken Connor. Maybe then they will understand how visible they can be and will be, if it is important. Not without a reason John Pike says: " It's a black -bag , breaking -and- entering , Mission Impossible -type agency ."

Jeff Stein wrote for the Washington Post in 2010: " ... a joint CIA -NSA surgery known as the Special Collection Service, conduct ultra-sensitive operations against foreign targets from U.S. and allied embassies abroad." Abroad is even Germany! Stone also quoted Matthew M. Aid , an author: "The targets of the special collection units include the cell phone communications of (foreign ) government ministers, police officials, military commanders (and) ... security teams that are following (our) intelligence agents around the city ..."

Beside nervous people from various ministries the intelligence services are targeted by the SCS. Proactive measures are necessary, if the operations of the SCS shall run again walls. To do this one must understand the historical development of the SCS. It has of course technical reasons why the SCS teams are being substantially increasing. The old structures - two to three people and corresponding shift work – are things of the past. Today they cooperate with other units, which are also essential for more black operations, observation etc. Even for this you can find relevant literature. I recommend to go through old FOIA documents. There one might come to code F6 . This would lead to the HQ (Beltsville, MD), possibly one would be able to piece together 600 employees ... looking for F7 would help to understand suspicious SIGINT operations in this country, and perhaps this would lead to SORC/FP. And then prepare the paralysing counter operation...

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