Samstag, 23. Juni 2018

Gonen Segev in former times...

...wasn't so open to Iran as he seems  to be in the last years - regarding Israels Shin Bet, charging him with spying for Iran, giving Israel’s arch-foe sensitive information about locations of security centers and the country’s energy industry. 

His position in 1995:


              (Source: The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995, p. 103)

Other sources say he is a classic type [to be targeted] because he is greedy and readily gets involved in dubious transactions. 

But why all this anger by Shin Bet and other "institutes" about him? Can it be that there are other reasons for his arrest? Maybe his connection to a security company with a "special" background? Some powerful dark figures in the ecstasy trade? Or is it a revenge of Yossi Beilins network for Segevs pressure in 1994  - when he was a Knesset member - to reveal some details about secret cooperation between Israel and two not named countries?

Even in Israel it is the same as in Germany with the media and their unexperienced freelance journalists: They claim to publish thrilling new, unknown details or they believe their sources that the information is new, but in reality it is nothing spectacular. The Times of Israel writes: A former head of the Shin Bet security service said Saturday that prior to being recruited by Iran to spy on Israel, disgraced ex-minister Gonen Segev was a kidnap target of the Lebanese Hezbollah terror group, an Iranian proxy.

This is not new.


Already stated in 2003:



 
 And so on... 

Asking Google Maps Segev could have walk in 1 hour 28 min minimum from his working place in Abuja....


... to this place in Abuja:


But all this is still speculation. Combing through the documents and analyzing his social network there are a few interesting details to see, regarding his friends from Israel, his connections to some embassies etc. Not only Israel should ask its counterintelligence experts about possible leaks.

Samstag, 16. Juni 2018

Drinking beer with Arafat

Recentlly I drank a beer in Brussels named Illegaal. The label showed a well known person:


The taste did not remind me of the alleged poisoning of Arafat by the Mossad - the beer was ok - but: I read a new book, in which, among other things, Arafat's role in terrorism is presented. So I reflected on new business ideas. I suspect that the biggest problem will be the export to individual countries.

Behind enemy lines...

...is the title of a new brief paper I published, subtitle: "Infiltration of Western police and intelligence agencies".


It can be downloaded on my website.

Originally I planned a much more extensive paper with a lot more case studies, but finally I ended up with a brief overview. Due to sheer number of cases, persons and the frightening development in Western countries maybe next time more.

Mittwoch, 6. Juni 2018

Game of Pawns - again and again


One of the last cases in espionage conducted by Chinese intelligence shows again a few interesting details. As far as I understand the arrested person is not finally convicted and so I will not give his or her name away. Anyway: The person I am talking about is one of the latest in a long line of former US intelligence officers, many of them working now as a private contractor, accused to be a spy for China.

Regarding the documents related to this case the person worked – beside other functions – here (I did all the blackening because I don’t think that every detail should be posted online):


The interesting detail is about the commercialisation of promoting „friendship“ between China and the US. There are similar business models in Germany as well and it is necessary to investigate them – due to their harmless appearance and their honorable goal they represent a great challenge for counterintelligence. They can rely on a mass of mostly local politicians and business folks which are so naive to think they are NOT cooperating with the Chinese government. Any criticism of this “friendship” promotion is often condemned as racism, neo-colonalism etc. by the (in Australia so-called) “panda-huggers”. It is no wonder that Confucius Institutes can be opened in Germany, whereas in other countries some of them are closed again for good reasons. Not every Friendship Institute is a nest of spies, but given the massive expansion of Chinese efforts, caution is needed.

The documents related to the mentioned case show further details which could be the basis for an extensive analysis of the current Chinese way of operation, their front companies, way of payment and of communication etc.

Some remarks of the FBI Special Agent in charge reminds me on the great danger of leaked or stolen documents when it come to the sources on the ground:


A not too extensive research in the open web and not digging into the mass of Snowden files gave me a trove of NOFORN documents which are obviously not for the public. One example (and again I did the blackening):


Another one:



In this document I can read relevant details as:



The Chinese intelligence agents have a good chance to find interesting details online – just in case they will not find a greedy foreigner, willing to sell national security assets. For all the future traitors I recommend a short movie, which is about this Game of Pawns.