Mittwoch, 31. August 2011

Nokia Siemens Networks, Trovicor, T-Online, NARUS, Deutsche Bahn usw.

In letzter Zeit wurde es wieder zum Thema: Der Einsatz westlicher Überwachungstechnologie in repressiven, autoritären Staaten. Zuletzt ärgerten sich Nokia Siemens Networks über schlechte Presse, im zitierten Fall handelte es sich um einen Bloomberg-Artikel von Vernon Silver und Ben Elgin. Dort war im Zusammenhang mit der Verhaftung eines Aktivisten in Bahrain u.a. zu lesen: „...they dragged him upstairs for questioning by a uniformed officer armed with another kind of weapon: transcripts of his text messages and details from personal mobile phone conversations, he says…“It was amazing,” he says of the messages they obtained. “How did they know about these?” The answer: Computers loaded with Western-made surveillance software generated the transcripts wielded in the interrogations…The spy gear in Bahrain was sold by Siemens AG (SIE), and maintained by Nokia Siemens Networks and NSN’s divested unit, Trovicor GmbH…” Der komplette Artikel ist hier zu lesen: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-22/torture-in-bahrain-becomes-routine-with-help-from-nokia-siemens-networking.html (31.08.2011).

Die Antwort von Nokia Siemens Networks wird folgendermaßen eingeleitet: „An article from Bloomberg published on 23 August 2011 has linked technology, supplied by a business that was part of Nokia Siemens Networks between April 2007 and March 2009, with human rights abuses in Bahrain…”, hier nachzulesen: http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/news-events/press-room/statements/telecoms-and-human-rights (31.08.2011). Hier wird hervorgehoben, dass es sich um die Vergangenheit handelt und man mit solchen bösen Dingen nicht mehr in Verbindung gebracht werden will.

Hm....*denk*

Ich hatte bereits vor längerer Zeit gehört, dass in Nordkorea angeblich seit Jahren deutsche Überwachungstechnologie zum Einsatz kommen würde, z. B. um den Standort nicht angemeldeter Mobilfunkgeräte – und davon gibt es immer mehr – im Land, insbesondere in der Grenzregion zu China, lokalisieren zu können. Zuletzt schienen die Nordkoreaner dazu überzugehen, chinesische Technologie zum Einsatz zu bringen. Dazu und zum oben angeschnittenen Problem wollten Jens Rosenke und ich bereits in unserem Aufsatz „Blut ist dicker als Wasser. Die chinesisch-nordkoreanische Militär und Geheimdienstkooperation“ (siehe hier: http://stephanblancke.blogspot.com/2011/05/china-nordkorea-militar-und.html) etwas schreiben, jedoch hatte der Verlag Angst vor rechtlichen Schritten bekommen. Ursprünglich sollte in unserem Aufsatz in einer Fußnote stehen:

„Die Rolle der VRC im Cyber War ist ein eigenständiges Thema. Aktuelle Entwicklungen wie die von ihr durchgeführten Satellitenmanöver von SJ-12 und SJ-06F und ihre Integration in die IT-Kommunikation wären hier eventuell zu untersuchen, ebenso das Ob und Wie der Partizipation für die DVRK. Zu untersuchen wäre auch der Einsatz von westlicher Überwachungstechnologie in der DVRK. In der Vergangenheit gab es einen nicht unerheblichen Anteil deutscher Technologie, die in den letzten Monaten offenbar weitgehend durch chinesische ersetzt worden ist. Siemens hat nach eigenen Angaben den entsprechenden Technikbereich an Trovicor verkauft, jedoch ist weder von dort als auch von Nokia Siemens Networks eine Stellungnahme zu bekommen. In den deutschen Auslandshandelseinrichtungen ist nach dortigen Auskünften keinerlei Auflistung zu Technikkooperationen vorhanden. Ebenso schweigsam gibt sich die European Business Assiociation (EBA), die ansonsten sehr aktiv in der DVRK ist. Das Problem der Proliferation von IT-Technologie bedarf einer eingehenden Analyse. Angesichts der Kooperation der DVRK mit Myanmar und dem Wunsch des dortigen Regimes nach verschlüsselter Kommunikation und Überwachung sollte dieser Bereich verstärkt beobachtet und ausgewertet werden.“

Die Trovicor GmbH ist eine interessante Firma, was ich hier nicht weiter vertiefen möchte. Ein erster Blick ins Handelsregister ist schon spannend. Fest steht jedoch, dass die Frage nach dem Einsatz westlicher Technologie in bestimmten Staaten viel zu selten thematisiert wird. Dabei kommen da immer wieder interessante Aspekte ans Tageslicht. So hatte ich bereits die Firma NARUS in einem älteren Beitrag erwähnt und dazu geschrieben:

„Übrigens wird oder wurde die Technologie von Narus auch von der der deutschen Firma T-Online eingesetzt. Auf meine mehrfachen Anfragen hat T-Online so reagiert, wie es sich für einen muffigen, ehemaligen Beamtenkonzern gehört: Ignorieren und aussitzen. Weil mich das aber ärgert, habe ich diesen Fall nun in meiner Dissertation verewigt.“ (siehe hier: http://stephanblancke.blogspot.com/2011/01/narus-in-agypten-und-deutschland.html).

Die offensichtliche Kooperation einzelner Firmen mit fragwürdigen oder zumindest hinterfragungswürdigen Partnern wird eigentlich erst dann offen gelegt, wenn der Druck durch eine NGO oder den Staatsanwalt zu hoch wird. Das ist nicht nur schade, denn eventuell haben die genannten Firmen nichts zu verbergen und ich sehe Gespenster. Warum sollte z. B. die Deutsche Bahn mir nicht mitteilen, welche Rolle Chinese Railways Geschäft spielt und was für Kooperationen da laufen. Aber: Die Deutsche Bahn stellt sich taub, so einfach ist das (siehe hier: http://stephanblancke.blogspot.com/2011/08/deutsche-bahn-db-and-chinese-railways.html).
Letztendlich ist es aber auch schlichtweg dumm von den Betroffenen, denn früher oder später kommt es doch ans Tageslicht. Ich kann sehr hartnäckig und einfallsreich sein, wenn man mich für dumm verkaufen möchte.

Dienstag, 23. August 2011

EADS goes by rail

A few days ago – time and date are not important – I took the train from A to B, sitting there and reading about security problems inside the military industry, insider threats and bad spies from the outside. Louis Gallois, head of EADS – Europe’s defence and aerospace group, told us that industrial espionage threat is very real and very dangerous in China. Only in China?

I found myself inside a typical situation, which was predestinated for any ambitious spy from a foreign country, a noisy competitor or just an engaged extremist who wants to bomb the company. This situation shows me clearly how mindless all this stupid corporate papers and out-dated power point lectures are, when it comes to the profane and boring time in the afternoon, driving home, thinking about the girl last night, waiting for the next beer: A man sat in front of me, tired and obviously frustrated with his personal situation (Yes, I can interpret your facial expression and I can read in your sad eyes).

He ate his unhealthful chips, drank his unhealthful lemonade and decided to accept the incoming telephone call. With a too loud and clear voice he said his name and then, recognizing that it was his friend or colleague on the line, named him with his name as well. They talked about their last project and at least arranged a meeting in a bar in the town I also know (btw: the beer in this bar is too expensive).

After this disruption of my reading I examined his laptop.



And this:


Aha: EADS.  I checked my small private database via VPN and found 306 entries, among other things names, adresses, numbers etc. But this would be only important for a later background research – if this would be my intention.

Next thing: This guy was sitting at the end of the coach. Suddenly I had to go to the restroom and by accident I found later some pictures on my smartphone. Happily they were fuzzy *lol*

  
How many substantial errors can I list?

  1. The guy: He was talking too loud in the public about his plan for the evening with the accurate time, combined with
  2. my knowledge of his employer (EADS) and my pretty certain knowledge about
  3. his unhappiness, vanity and carelessness.
  4. The very easy access to his laptop: interfaces were open. Maybe bluetooth as well, his mobile on the table in front of me. And of course his
  5. really dense idea to read something on the laptop in the public. Et al. there were plans from buildings, sheets etc. easy to see.

This guy had luck – not only because I will not show his real face. If I would have a clear picture of his face maybe the following result would be another one…. And maybe Facebook Face Recognition would bring more results…

Ergo: Back to school!

Of course I don´t like trusts dealing with military stuff, but: They are building planes like Airbus as well. Ok, if they will ask me very friendly and promise to pay me much money I will teach them avoiding situations like this one! It´s not enough to build up an internal huge security branch with former intelligence officers. A few simple tricks and you will get an overload of information like the one above or the following:

And this is just a very simple example. I can remember a lecture of a journalist who showed me a few pictures directly taken inside the Airbus laboratories, which were not locked and not guarded by anyone. I still wonder how this can happen to a company which is to be found e.g. on the US-DOD contractors list with various entries. In 2009 Mr. Gallois discussed in Berlin the topic „Technology and People: Key Factors for a Sustainable Future of the Aeronautic, Space and Defence Industry“. Well, without a few clever security measures there will be no bright future and next year too no place on the “Top 100 Government Contractors”-list. And next time it´s not me sitting there amused, but a really bad guy…


Dienstag, 16. August 2011

Deutsche Bahn (DB) and Chinese Railways

In the current issue of The Economist (August 13th – 19th 2011) one can read an exciting article, you will never find in any German weekly: “The Queensway syndicate and the Africa trade“ (p. 15 ff.) Subject is et al. the Queensway Group in Hong Kong, famous for insiders as a shadowy and complex Chinese structure of firms, some of them intelligence and/or government related and well known for its (Chinese) wall: no or few informations as possible about the business, network, financial engagements and contracts.

One figure to name – and the mentioned article name him – is Mr. Sam Pa, maybe one of the spiders in the network, maybe the one and only spider. Concerning to him The Economist writes about “a 2009 American congressional report”, which is of course a great source for every Asian intelligence researcher. For understanding Chinese (intelligence) activities in Africa and elsewhere check the firms and persons mentioned in this and other reports, make an update of the personal status and connect the dots. There are more than only the big players as China International Fund or China Sonangol. The Queensway syndicate was asked by The Economist about a few points dealing with African politics. And of course: They heard nearly nothing. But this is not only the case with Chinese stubborn quasi governmental firms. It can be the same problem with German stubborn quasi governmental firms: Look at the Deutsche Bahn (DB).

A time ago I read this:

“DB and Chinese rail ministry to ramp up cooperation 11. Dezember 2010

Deutsche Bahn and the Chinese railways ministry have plans to cooperate more closely in railfreight transport and in expanding Chinese rail infrastructure. Both parties confirmed their intention of strengthening railfreight operations between Asia and Europe and to step up the establishment of new transportation options. In 2010 DB International won bids for five construction supervision projects for nine high-speed routes in China. The total contract volume is worth around EUR 30 million. (ben)“

Source: http://www.transportjournal.com/index.php?id=425&tx_ttnews[pS]=1292572144&tx_ttnews[pointer]=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=20919&tx_ttnews[backPid]=505&cHash=d1fe8b32427e8db7c47188f594d02d87 (16.08.2011)

An elder press release said this:

“CHINESE RAIL OPERATOR OPENS OFFICES IN BERLIN

On December 14, 2005 China's national rail operator opened its European representation in Berlin. The offices are the outcome of an agreement over closer cooperation in the railway sector between Germany and the People's Republic of China. The agreement was signed in Beijing June 6, 2005 by the then German Transport Minister Manfred Stolpe and his Chinese counterpart, Liu Zhijun. As the official representation for the Chinese rail ministry in Europe, the offices will primarily be responsible for coordinating economic, technical and staff-related cooperation between China's railways and rail operators in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Another key aim will be to improve container transportation between China and Europe….”

Source: http://www.berlin-partner.de/en/informationspool/presse/current-press-information/single-view/view/germany-and-china-strengthen-r.html (16.08.2011)

Chinese Railways is not just a company. It’s a synonym for the Chinese political system and Chinese Railways is part of a powerful system, “far less understood…”, but members of this system, “-its banks, local-government “financing platforms”, securities companies and corporations – affect the country´s economic choices and development path. Of course, behind these entities lies the Communist Party of China”. I suggest to one of the best books about Chinese economics I ever read and which I took the citation from: Red Capitalism. The Fragile Financial Foundation of China´s Extraordinary Rise” (Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, Singapore 2011).

I could go on with describing the role of the intelligence structure of the Chinese Communist Party and their way to infiltrate, building up front companies etc., but here I want to point out the role of Chinese Railways. Their position in a network was described by Alex Vines, Lillian Wong, Markus Weimer and Indira Campos:

It would take time to describe the connections which are mentioned here, but clear to see the link to CIF(L), which is to find in the offices of the 88 Queensway Group.

To read in the US congressional report: “Contracts for projects financed by CIFL are reserved for companies selected by the 88 Queensway Group. These projects have been awarded to two types of companies: 1) Chinese construction companies with connections to individuals involved in the 88 Queensway Group, including China Railway 20th Bureau Group Corporation…”.

And Germany? What the hell is Chinese Railways doing in Berlin? They call it their Representative office in Europe:



Hm… a representative office without email and apparently no one to see at normal (!) office hours.

Contact:
Chinese Railways Representative Office in Europe
Maerkisches Ufer 28
10179 Berlin, Germany
Tel.: +49 30 2345 8710
Fax.: +49 30 2478 1332

Other people snooped on them in earlier times, as John Alexander Symonds in his “Romeo Spy” mentioned in one small sentence. Ok, so I did it the usual way and asked them with a fake account via their Chinese email for a contact. Their answer was short and simple: rui@wl89.com. That was all.

But what about the Deutsche Bahn? First I asked the “Eisenbahn Bundesamt”. As the German governmental office for all aspects of the German railway system they should know it. They answered me immediately, but sorry: There seems to be no information at their desks. So I asked Deutsche Bahn. They are partners of Chinese Railways and they must know something about them.

On April 15th 2011 I wrote Deutsche Bahn an email:

“können Sie mir einen Ansprechpartner (Email) von Ihrem Geschäftspartner "China Railways" in Berlin nennen?“

On May 5th 2011 I reminded Deutsche Bahn on my first email. They answered me on the same day:

“ …Ihre Anfrage haben wir am 15. April umgehend an den Fachbereich
weitergeleitet
Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Angelika Theidig
PR&Interne Kommunikation DB-Konzern
(GKU 2)

DB Mobility Logistics AG
Potsdamer Platz 2, 10785 Berlin
Tel. 030 297-61546, intern 999-...“

On May 27 th 2011 I reminded Deutsche Bahn again:

„Sehr geehrte Frau Theidig,

heute, also über einen Monat später, habe ich weiterhin keinerlei Reaktion Ihres Fachbereiches erhalten. Können Sie da bitte nochmal nachhaken?“

On June 9 th 2011 I reminded Deutsche Bahn again and again no reaction:

„Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

mir wäre es lieber,wenn Sie mir offen mitteilen würden, dass Sie mir nicht behilflich sein wollen. Damit kann ich leben und ich kann diese Information dann entsprechend in meinen Text einfliessen lassen.
Ich erinnere Sie also noch einmal höflich an meine Anfrage.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen...“

My conclusion: Deutsche Bahn is not better than Chinese Railways. Both seems to be shrouded in secrecy, but why? The difference is that I can´t go to the Chinese and force them to talk with me. But Deutsche Bahn is getting my money, at least for permanently (often for hours) delayed trains. Why are they so interested in letting me not know? They are working together with a firm, which stands in a network of intelligence and governmental interests. And as I wrote in my essay about the Chinese and North Korean intelligence cooperation: Firms like Chinese Railways are often some kind of front companies. In this case the Chinese agents have only a few meters to their embassy.