Counterintelligence

...is - in my opinion - underestimated. In former years there was not too much to be seen inside the club, but nowadays it is developing. Here my brief update: At the 18th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 9, 2018, the Qingdao Declaration reaffirmed the importance of the SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RAT) in the fight against the so-called "three evils" terrorism, extremism and separatism. The corresponding document covers the period 2019-2021. The SCO expects an upsurge of "the potential of cooperation between competent agencies". The special role of the defense ministries and intelligence agencies was already highlighted at the SCO Defense and Security Forum in December 2017. In May 2018, participants in the 13th Meeting of Presidents and Chief Justices of the Supreme Courts of the SCO Member States emphasized the importance of big data and artificial intelligence for this collaboration. This development worries NATO in...

... es gibt bekannterweise viele Bezeichnungen, Schmähungen und Kritik, wenn es um die Medien geht. Und man muss es tatsächlich kritisieren, wenn hierzulande - und anderswo - die sogenannten Qualitätsmedien sich ergeben und hörig jenen Foren und Recherchekollektiven hingeben, die behaupten, sie würden Fälschungen, Fake News und sonstige Übel in der Gesellschaft aufspüren und die Verantwortlichen benennen, um sie dann - ganz in der Tradition der DDR Blockwarte oder in Erinnerung der eigenen Stasi-Karriere - an den virtuellen Pranger zu stellen. Diese Moralapostel verfolgen jedoch zumeist  selbst eine politische Agenda, wollen und können daher auch nicht objektiv sein. Dazu kommt noch eine Menge an Leuten, die ein wenig hier und dort klicken, ein wenig Twitter durchstöbern und sich dann in epischer Breite zu Themen auslassen, von denen sie keine oder wenig Ahnung haben. Apropos epische Breite: Ich komme zum Punkt. Im Rahmen einer Recherche zu deutschen Söldnern in der Ukraine sto...

Apparently unnoticed by the appropriate authorities, the political and economic influence of certain Chinese organizations in Europe and Germany continues to develop. It is amazing to see how unknown is, for example, the European Confederation of Fujian Associations or even the United Front Work Department. The statements of so-called "experts" responsible for counter-intelligence is more or less frustrating.   On the European level some of those influential persons can be asked about their work and their political agenda at their regular meetings: In Germany one could call this gentleman and discuss his solely economic interests and "independence" from the Chinese Communist Party: It's not just shady business people, academics and politicians of the B class in Bucharest who are paid by Beijing and who enthusiastically present Xi Jinping's book - which is as dull as dishwater - to the camera. No, the influence takes place in the middle o...

Publications from Western military, describing their aim with providing "an overview of research done inside the Belgian Armed Forces in the period 2015 - 2016 to address their specific needs, whether in the short term, mid term or long term" and "The selected topics give insights into the multifaceted military research" really astonishes me. Continuing with: "We are confident that, while reading or scrolling through this report, your interest in Belgian research will thrive." Haha...Yes of course! I know a few people who will be interested. You can find them e.g. here . I try not to be naive but anyway: Why should foreign forces (again) get a nice overview about sensitive topics as these: Ok, I am naive: They already know this. Since it's online anyway, I could post it here as well, but something blocks me inside!

... berichtet seit vielen Jahren und aus gutem Grunde über bestimmte sicherheitspolitische Entwicklungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Je weiter man dabei in die Vergangenheit zurückgeht und in alten Ausgaben blättert, desto deutlicher wird, dass bestimmte Entwicklungen nie ganz verschwunden waren und über andere plötzlich nicht mehr berichtet wurde, um Jahre später ebenso plötzlich wieder aufzutauchen. Leider fehlt meinem Archiv weiterhin der erste Bericht dieser Art mit dem Titel „Erfahrungen aus der Beobachtung und Abwehr rechtsradikaler und antisemitischer Tendenzen 1961“. Dafür konnte ich jedoch dank einer sehr netten Person die anderen Vorläuferberichte meiner Sammlung einverleiben, von denen ich nicht weiss, ob sie für die Öffentlichkeit gedacht waren. Diese haben die Titel: Die kommunistische Tätigkeit im Jahre 1964 Die kommunistische Tätigkeit im Jahre 1965 Die kommunistische Tätigkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1966 Erfahrungen aus der Beobachtung...

...were sometimes seen in the past, when their intelligence agency MOIS tracked down dissidents. The last incident showed their still ongoing efforts, including sleeper cell agents and one diplomat from the Iranian embassy in Vienna. This diplomat was charged by German authorities with planning an assault against a meeting of the exile group National Council of Resistance of Iran. The Federal Prosecutor General was a little bit shy and named the suspect Assadollah A. But a simple check of the Vienna embassy staff shows more details. Using an explosive device for political reasons is a strong signal, but it is one instrument of influencing the political situation in a country. Accidentally I published a new paper today which looks into covert and clandestine operations of some states, which are extremely active in countries as Germany - often supposed by officials who are on their payroll or just think this is the right way to do politics. These operations can be aggressive and...

... was a public diplomacy publication of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which provided an estimate of the military strategy and capabilities of the Soviet Union during the final years of the Cold War, ostensibly to alert the U.S. public to the significant military capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces . The single publications were not classified and can be downloaded easily. A few days ago I found three of them in a box, hidden in an dusty bookstore in Dublin. Inside were a few old articles from newspapers of the 80s and one - Volume 1987 - was stamped presumably by the US Embassy in Dublin. More interesting is a document, made with a good old typewriter, which I found inside. It seems to be - more or less - a compilation, written 1987 by the Unites States Information Service (USIS), the former name of the today's United States Information Agency. Nothing Top Secret, but anyway its a nice historical piece. Due to the dusty place I found it I decided to publi...

...wasn't so open to Iran as he seems  to be in the last years - regarding Israels Shin Bet, charging him with spying for Iran, giving Israel’s arch-foe sensitive information about locations of security centers and the country’s energy industry.  His position in 1995:               (Source: The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1995, p. 103) Other sources say he is a classic type [to be targeted] because he is greedy and readily gets involved in dubious transactions.  But why all this anger by Shin Bet and other " institutes " about him? Can it be that there are other reasons for his arrest? Maybe his connection to a security company with a "special" background? Some powerful dark figures in the ecstasy trade? Or is it a revenge of Yossi Beilins network for Segevs pressure in 1994  - when he was a Knesset member - to reveal some details about secret cooperation between Israel and two not named cou...

Recentlly I drank a beer in Brussels named Illegaal. The label showed a well known person: The taste did not remind me of the alleged poisoning of Arafat by the Mossad - the beer was ok - but: I read a new book, in which, among other things, Arafat's role in terrorism is presented. So I reflected on new business ideas. I suspect that the biggest problem will be the export to individual countries.

...is the title of a new brief paper I published, subtitle: "Infiltration of Western police and intelligence agencies". It can be downloaded on my website . Originally I planned a much more extensive paper with a lot more case studies, but finally I ended up with a brief overview. Due to sheer number of cases, persons and the frightening development in Western countries maybe next time more.

One of the last cases in espionage conducted by Chinese intelligence shows again a few interesting details. As far as I understand the arrested person is not finally convicted and so I will not give his or her name away. Anyway: The person I am talking about is one of the latest in a long line of former US intelligence officers, many of them working now as a private contractor, accused to be a spy for China. Regarding the documents related to this case the person worked – beside other functions – here (I did all the blackening because I don’t think that every detail should be posted online): The interesting detail is about the commercialisation of promoting „friendship“ between China and the US. There are similar business models in Germany as well and it is necessary to investigate them – due to their harmless appearance and their honorable goal they represent a great challenge for counterintelligence. They can rely on a mass of mostly local...

Ich las im Qualitätsmedium T-Online vor ein paar Tagen über Mateusz Piskorski. Dieser sei in in Polen inhaftiert „wegen Spionage für russische und chinesische Geheimdienste an – er pflegt auch enge Kontakte zu deutschen Politikern“. T-Online habe auch kürzlich „ enthüllt“, dass Piskorski kurz vor seiner Verhaftung „einen Verein mit mehrerenAfD-Politikern in Berlin“ gegründet habe… Ziel des Vereins war es, sogenannte "Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen" in völkerrechtlich umstrittene, aber kremltreue Separatistengebiete zu organisieren und damit russische Außenpolitik zu legitimieren.“ Über diese Berichterstattung kann ich nur müde lächeln: Was hier als tolle Story verkauft wird, ist jedem, der sich ernsthaft und nicht nur je nach politischem Windchen damit beschäftigt, in den meisten Details längst bekannt. Natürlich bedarf es einer gewissen Intensität und Tiefe, was die Recherchen dazu angeht, aber möglicherweise haben die dafür zuständigen Leute etwas verschlafen oder das...

Beim Lesen alter Ausgaben von "Horch & Guck" fiel mir der Name Andrei Mironow auf - jenem Russen, der am 24. Mai 2014 bei Gefechten zwischen ukrainischen Streitkräften und prorussischen Kräften in Slowjansk getötet wurde. Das Foto, das in der Ausgabe von "Horch & Guck" - wer kennt diese Reihe überhaupt noch? - von ihm abgedruckt war, sieht ein wenig anders als die letzen Aufnahmen von ihm aus: [Quelle: Horch & Guck, Heft 17 (4/95), S. 53] Interessant fand ich in dem Artikel dieser Ausgabe den Satz: Und wenn er gerade mal nicht an der Front ist, sammelt er fieberhaft geheime Informationen über die neue chemische Waffe Nowitschok , an deren Produktion Rußland arbeite. Ich werde wohl nie erfahren, was er zu Nowitschok alles gesammelt hatte. Mein letzter Besuch in London zeigte mir zumindest erneut, dass die politische Bedeutung der russischen Organisierten Kriminalität im Zusammenhang mit solchen Fällen unterschätzt wird. Und wer weiss, was ...

...or: The rise of Frankenstein's Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats .  Discussing this with a few people from the counterproliferation branch I recognized that I have to learn something new regarding Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD): Who knows anything about CRISPR? But a lot more people read about Genetic Engineering - which is a good starter to understand CRISPR -  and I remember a case, many years ago, when a North Korean scientist disappeared in Australia. He was suspected of having developed a weapon based on genetic experiments. This case is still shrouded in secrecy and rumours, but it was one of the first cases ever appeared in the public. I plan to write a brief paper about it in the near future. Genetic Engineering was already in the seventies subject of e.g. a meeting about INFORMAL MEETINGS ON NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS : Combining various search operators - which include CRISPR and WMD - I was surprised by my own data I o...

In the last days a lot of media reports referred to a UN Report not published yet, describing that " North Korea has been sending equipment to Syria that could be used to make chemical weapons ". In a few reports one responsible Syrian institution is mentioned: The Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC). Hundreds of people working for this Center are sanctioned since last April 2017. Interesting for me is that organisations which are connected to this Center and which are playing a crucial role, are not sanctioned. First of all I think about the Network of Syrian Scientists, Technologists and Innovators Abroad (NOSSTIA), which is working somehow under the radar. I came across a brief notice about a meeting on "environment projects", which was described by the Syrian Arab News Agency in April 2016. This was the first time ever I read about NOSSTIA and so I tried to take a look at their website. Today they seem to operate two Facebook accounts which I w...