Among other things, the collapse of the current government in Germany and the need for new elections mean that the Chinese government is stepping up its measures on German soil.
Priority targets are German officials (politics, business, media) as well as relevant institutions and organisations (political foundations, think tanks, selected university departments). To this end, they operate individual cells in Berlin that keep a close eye on government operations and the activities of the coalition partners in the collapsing government. The cells consist of different groups of people and do not necessarily have to be Chinese citizens or of Chinese origin. More important are their respective, useful accesses. The information in which they are interested is obtained and processed in different ways. This is partly done in consultation with other governments, provided they do not stand in the way of Chinese interests. Special targets are dealt with in a coordinated manner. This intelligence co-operation is currently a fundamental problem that is on the increase, but obviously receives too little attention in Germany.
Chinese measures are carried out in various ways and with the help of different organisations. For example, some of these measures are organised by the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC), which is closely linked to the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Other influence and espionage takes place through the cooperation of German universities or party-affiliated institutions with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). To the great delight of the government in Beijing, the fact that CICIR is an organisation under control of Chinese intelligence has not yet been recognised in some places or is simply ignored.
The more than hundred paged list of alleged UFWD employees in Europe - and therefore also in Germany - that became public a while ago appears plausible overall. However, a risk assessment of individual persons or organisations, as is being carried out by some solely on the basis of this list, is not serious.
For a realistic political science analysis, for example, background information and details on members of the Chinese Communist Party are useful. The more one can include, the better.
If, for example, telephone numbers or details of official documents of hundreds, thousands or even millions of party members can be compared with other lists, interesting correlations can sometimes be established. The importance of individuals in Chinese decision-making processes, including in the area of intelligence operations, is repeatedly underestimated in Germany.
However, an analysis of individual persons or organisations involved in the Chinese measures in or against Germany is not yet complete with mere database queries. It would be highly dubious to claim this. Not everything can be explained or obtained with a single click. Similarly, the information used should not come from outdated official databases. Up-to-dateness cannot be achieved through compartmentalisation and growing restrictive legal control. In this respect, certain official awareness meetings with the German industry are of little help if this is not based on reliable sources, but only on own outdated public reports.What is needed, for example, is a trusting cooperation with experienced regional partners.
It is also surprising that important decision-makers or government officials are amazed at the close ties between the communist party and industry in China: Employees of individual Chinese companies who previously held - or continue to hold - an important position in a government agency are not uncommon. Inquisitive Chinese visitors to the Confucius Institutes in Germany (yes, these are still welcome cooperation partners at German universities) with a party background: For some of those responsible, this seems to come straight out of a bad spy movie.
And finally, despite all the focus on Russian operations in Germany, it should not be overlooked which Chinese functionaries appear or have appeared in Germany together with official representatives of Russia - publicly and also with German guests. The latter should find out in advance whether their dialogue partners are actually Chinese dissidents or rather agents.
However, target persons such as politicians, people working in sensitive industries or certain academics should be informed about the background of their contacts - no matter if they are Chinese or people and organisations, paid by China. If you have any questions about the effort and costs of such a political science analysis, feel free to contact our network.
Kommentare
Kommentar veröffentlichen