Tracking illicit trade networks in Asia...

...is something I like to do, because it definitely pays off.

2016 I wrote something about the connection between China, Pakistan and North Korea - which resulted in a lot of harsh reactions from Pakistan.

Well, I am ready to take another slap: My new piece is some kind of continuation - even if North Korea seems not to be so present this time. The key-points in this case are:

State-sponsored or state-owned companies that are engaged in illicit proliferation and procurement are likely to use networks of smaller, less prominent companies in their activities.
A case study involving the sale of potentially proliferation-relevant products from a Chinese company to a Pakistani company underlines the level of complexity and opacity that is involved in the operations of these networks.
Organised crime groups may be able to circumvent sanctions by using small, inconspicuous companies, as well as discreet financial transactions.

The paper is published by Jane's Intelligence Review online and will be out as a printed version soon.

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